The big tech companies deploy nationalist arguments that the guarantee of American investment is exactly what their business model is. National Security or U.S. Will not hurt foreign policy. Without federal privacy laws to regulate data collection and distribution, however, that is not true. This data-brokerage ecosystem allows the data of U.S. citizens to end up in the hands of a foreign government, threatens national security and potentially sabotages U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy activities. It also undermines American credibility on data issues; If the White House takes action against individual Chinese tech companies while Congress does not pass any secrecy law, for example, the Beijing U.S. While seeking to eliminate potential means of spying on citizens, the U.S. is more focused on targeting companies than reducing overall data. Spread damage

These big tech arguments relate to another concern of the weak U.S. secrecy law: distrust of U.S. tech companies abroad.

The US tech giants have numerous legitimate reasons for having reputation problems abroad, ranging from intense market power and widespread lobbying to being able to spread online and vast, exploitative data collections. Phrases such as “data colonialism” and “digital colonialism” are used to characterize this phenomenon, especially when large tech companies enter low-resource countries (e.g., Venezuela, Uganda, India), surveying citizens. Is, and all values ​​return to them. Headquarters while perpetuating other problems such as unequal divisions of labor.

It doesn’t have to be this way. Right now, American civil servants are renewing their transatlantic data-transfer agreements with their European Union counterparts, after a European Court of Human Rights invalidated the Privacy Shield framework in July 2020. Reason for invalidating any EU-US data transfer agreement. But Washington Washington could reduce its position by placing new, real barriers to the data collection, distribution and use of American companies. However, Shrems II, U.S. Focuses on National Security Access Access to Data in No. This absence of strong privacy laws, always enters into the same conversation about inappropriateness.

U.S. Passing a strong federal privacy law in the U.S. could also help American companies capture the increasingly complex and fracture regulatory landscape globally. For example, India’s Personal Data Protection Bill, which was introduced in 2019 and is still under consideration, was inspired by the EU’s GDPR (although it includes a dangerously comprehensive exemption for the state). Brazil’s General Data Protection Act also has similarities with GDPR. The more other governments enact privacy laws, the greater the risk of regulatory challenges and public distrust by US companies around the world.

Politicians compete in the U.S. Technol talks about the importance of having G companies, which should not come at the expense of democratic regulation to protect citizens from data-related misuse – nor should control over data abuse be seen as antithetical to any competitive opportunity. Field. This, in turn, reaps more data regulation globally, as Silicon Valley faces more scrutiny in overseas markets, and relies partly on the country’s privacy regime with confidence in artificial intelligence, leading to the U.S. passing a strong federal privacy law. S. So there can be many benefits. Tech competitiveness.

Recently announced The US-EU Trade and Technology Council, through which the US and EU member states engage in dialogue on everything from Internet policy to the development of standards, has a strong focus on China. Coming out of the G7 summit in June, Biden focused on providing a “democratic alternative” to the Chinese government’s influence.

Biden’s plan to unite democracies on tech faces many challenges, in part because it is not clear that formulating anti-democracy-authoritarianism is the best way to combat digital oppression. Depending on the implementation of the plan, it will erroneously ignore the differences between democracies over how to overcome technical challenges. EU member states, for example, are seldom in a row with Washington on a range of Internet policy issues. India is often referred to as a democratic group in these conversations, but the Modi government’s repression, attacks on democracy and internet misuse call into question this.